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It is generally believed that ¯scal consolidations should occur prior to a country's
admission to the European Monetary Union (EMU). This paper argues that the ¯scal
Maastricht Criteria require badly timed, costly adjustments while not guaranteeing
sustained ¯scal restraint. An e®ective Stability Pact is not only necessary, but
should replace the Maastricht Criteria altogether. These conclusions are based on
simulations scrutinising the e®ects both of contractionary ¯scal policies and of joining
a monetary union. In a case study type analysis it is shown that there is a strong
case for both policy changes to happen at the same time.
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\Unsustainable" ¯scal policies in countries participating in the European Monetary Union
(EMU), or indeed any monetary union, may have negative consequences for other member
countries. First, ¯scal policy e®ects include macroeconomic spill-overs on other countries.
For instance, expansionary ¯scal policies in one country drive up union-wide interest rates
and thus borrowing costs in every member country. Second, if interest rates are pushed
up by ¯scal de¯cits, there may be pressure on the European Central Bank (ECB) to relax
monetary policy in order to bring interest rates back down again. Third, if a country's
indebtedness goes through the roof, it is not clear if a credible commitment can be made
{ due to the danger of contagion { not to bail that country out in case of default (despite
clear rules laid out by the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union (EU, 1992)).
For these reasons, rules were laid down for candidate countries to adhere to prior to being
awarded membership in the EMU.1 It was expected that prospective members would
be keener on satisfying ¯scal limits when their membership could still be jeopardised.
Once in the union, it was thought to be easier to keep their ¯scal policies in check.
This strategy does not seem to work though. Greece got away with cheating on the
entry criteria and several countries got away with violating the agreed-upon standards for
countries already participating in the EMU.2 Moreover, various onslaughts on the Pact
as a whole, particularly by French President Chirac and German Chancellor SchrÄ oder,
indicate a willingness to break or alter the commitment to ¯scal limits.
Thus far, I have given answers to the following questions: (i) what are the negative con-
sequences of excessive de¯cits and debt; and (ii) which political economy measures were
devised in the real world to avoid them? The public and academic debate on ¯scal con-
solidations in/for the EMU largely centres on those questions. At the same time, there
is a conspicuous absence of studies trying to capture the joint macroeconomic e®ects of
¯scal retrenchment policies and the start of a monetary union (notwithstanding investiga-
tions (see below) on each of the two issues separately). Such joint analyses are, however,
important, if one wants to justify the timing of ¯scal consolidations as required by the
1 The ¯scal Maastricht Convergence Criteria are speci¯ed in the Treaty on European Union (EU, 1992,
article 109 j (1)) as well as attached protocols (cf. Ä ONB, 1995, 107-111). They refer to requirements prior
to the start of the EMU in January 1999, but will also be applied to newly joining member countries:
government budget de¯cit (not primary de¯cit; de¯cit-GDP-ratio of not more than 3 %), and national
debt (debt-GDP-ratio of not more than 60 %).
2 The "Stability and Growth Pact" signed in Amsterdam in June 1997 urges all EMU member countries
to work towards a near balanced budget, with ¯nes envisaged if the ¯scal de¯cit exceeds 3 % of GDP.
However, France and Germany did not get ¯ned despite their violations in 2002 and subsequent years.
1Maastricht Criteria. If it turns out, as it does, that ¯scal retrenchment policies are less
costly, if they occur together with (rather than prior to) the start of the EMU, the value
of the consolidation exercise envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty is put in question al-
together. This is particularly true when acknowledging that political economy measures
put in place for preserving stringent ¯scal policies (Stability Pact) are not working, thus
undoing part of the success in limiting budget de¯cits and government debt (achieved by
the Maastricht Criteria before the start of the EMU). A workable Stability Pact would
not only guarantee sustained ¯scal stability, but also make costly ¯scal adjustments prior
to the admission to the EMU unnecessary.
This paper studies ¯scal consolidation policies in a monetary union from a purely macro-
economic perspective. In a case study, retrenchment policies in Italy are examined using a
multi-country simulation model. The direct impact as well as spill-over e®ects on in°ation,
economic growth and other key variables are analysed for EMU member countries. While
the need for ¯scal consolidations is not questioned, it is argued that requiring ¯scal adjust-
ments from a prospective member country prior to joining the EMU may be unjusti¯ed
from a macroeconomic point of view. The basic argument is simple. Fiscal consolida-
tions mean contractionary policies, whereas becoming a member in the EMU produces
(as shown in this paper) expansionary e®ects for a country like Italy. Hence, negative
e®ects of both events could be reduced, if they happened at the same time. Based on
macroeconomic similarities between Italy and some of the prospective candidate countries
it is then inferred that the same reasoning applies to the future enlargement of the EMU.
It is not straightforward to show the countervailing e®ects produced by contractionary
¯scal policies on the one hand and those caused by joining the EMU on the other hand.
The conceptual di±culty is to model the transition to a monetary union in such a way that
the macroeconomic e®ects of the regime change can be captured (see next paragraph). To
my knowledge this has not been done in the literature thus far (see indications on the
literature further down). The reason is probably that there is no standard approach for
analysing such a problem. Consequently, several methodical innovations (as indicated still
further down in this introduction) had to be introduced for being able to conduct the
analysis envisaged for this paper.
Membership in a monetary union requires acceptance of a common currency and a com-
mon central bank irrespective of cross-country di®erences in initial conditions. This is
sometimes called the \one-size-¯ts-all" problem. From the perspective of an individual
country, the common monetary policy induces interest rate changes relative to interest
rates obtained under national monetary autonomy, because short term nominal interest
2rates are equalised across the union. At the same time, national currencies are irrevocably
¯xed to the common currency at certain conversion rates. There are induced exchange rate
changes compared to exchange rates obtained in a situation without a monetary union.
Given that both nominal changes are not exogenous they cannot be called shocks. Instead
those changes are henceforth referred to as interest and exchange rate impulses. The word
impulse also signi¯es that they exhibit macroeconomic e®ects in member countries of the
union.
Despite the fact that interest and exchange rate impulses caused by the transition to a
monetary union are known, they are typically ignored in the literature. Either the ¯scal
convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty are analysed without modeling the EMU
itself (Hughes Hallett and McAdam, 1998a/b, and von Hagen and Lutz, 1996); or various
aspects of a monetary union are examined for a situation with the EMU already in place
(e.g. ¯scal consolidations by Hughes Hallett and Ma, 1996, e®ects of asymmetric shocks
by Hughes Hallett and Vines, 1993, or the response to symmetric shocks when national
preferences di®er by Masson and Melitz, 1991).
Szap¶ ary (2001) explicitly considers interest and exchange rate impulses, but for a di®erent
purpose. He argues verbally that the Maastricht Criteria would lead new members into
managing their macroeconomic indicators ine±ciently. Only Clausen (1998) comes close to
analytically tackling interest and exchange rate impulses by discussing the \inappropriate
choice of the conversion rates" (relating to the exchange rate impulse) and the \uncertainty
with respect to the future stance of monetary policy" (relating to the interest rate impulse).
But his small theoretical model does not allow him to capture interest rate impulses for
individual countries caused by the transition to a common monetary policy. Nor does he
evaluate the joint e®ect of interest and exchange rate impulses or interdependencies with
¯scal consolidations required by the Maastricht Treaty.
This paper accounts for all of these e®ects and interdependencies. By using a large econo-
metric dynamic multi-country simulation model (MULTIMOD, developed by the IMF),
the transition to the EMU and the period after its start can be included in one and the
same model. Thus it is possible to pinpoint interdependencies between interest and ex-
change rate impulses caused by forming a monetary union, and e®ects produced by ¯scal
retrenchment policies. This could not have been done by using a small theoretical model
because the explanatory power of small analytical models is limited in a dynamic multi-
country world, even if the structural break is not included.3 A calibrated macromodel
3 Ideally there should be three countries with two of them forming a monetary union and a third one
joining. Even using Aoki's (1981) method of averages and di®erences does not allow us to work with more
3would have been possible, in principle, but there are several disadvantages. In particular,
a calibrated model lacks detail and estimated relationships (of large econometric models)
necessary for being able to use real world data.4
As is standard in the simulation literature, this paper uses a counterfactual analysis to
study the e®ects of ¯scal policies and of joining a monetary union, i.e. the baseline
(benchmark) scenario is compared to alternative simulation scenarios. For methodologi-
cal reasons, it is, however, not possible to study the real world case of a country which
actually joined the EMU. The only case of a country joining the existing EMU, Greece in
2001, happened too recently to be used for conducting counterfactual simulation studies.
Similarly, individual countries who participated in the formation of the real world EMU
cannot be analysed, because there is not enough data as of yet. Furthermore, simulations
cannot be based on a future time period, because certain e®ects produced by joining a
monetary union cannot be captured (as discussed in section 2). Therefore, a hypotheti-
cal monetary union is constructed for a historical time period which is characterised by
conditions qualitatively similar to those observed for real world candidate countries. Even
though a simulation analysis typically produces quantitative results, this paper looks at
them qualitatively. The underlying e®ects can thus be revealed and interpreted.
Overall, the approach incorporates various innovations. First, notwithstanding the Lucas
(1976) Critique, the transition to the EMU is modeled explicitly and simulation results
account for the macroeconomic e®ects caused by becoming a member of the EMU. Second,
simulation results for a hypothetical monetary union are interpreted qualitatively. The
¯ndings refer to economic e®ects as they would have been obtained, if a small analytical
model could have been used. Third, some adjustments had to be made to the solution
algorithm because the structural break (requiring ¯xed exchange rates) is inconsistent with
the terminal conditions of the baseline (with di®erent exchange rates).5
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Sections 2 presents key features of the
model and clari¯es the simulation strategy. The following three sections discuss the main
scenarios: (i) monetary union; (ii) ¯scal policy (without monetary union); and (iii) ¯scal
policy under monetary union. Section 3 demonstrates that a monetary union produces
interest and exchange rate impulses year after year { relative to a situation without a
than 6 equations. Two equations per country are obviously not enough.
4 Aforementioned Hughes Hallett and Vines (1993) used a three country Dornbusch model in the Oudiz
and Sachs (1984) and McKibbin and Sachs (1991) tradition.
5 A procedure was devised for endogenously modifying steady state exchange rates. Further details
can be obtained from the author upon request.
4monetary union. A potential trade-o® between interest and exchange rate impulses is
revealed. In Italy, the nominal pre-EMU interest rate is considerably higher than the one
prevailing after the start of the EMU. At the same time, the Italian Lira is undervalued
(relative to purchasing power parity). Overall, Italy's membership in the EMU generates
an expansionary interest rate impulse which dominates the contractionary exchange rate
impulse. Section 4 introduces contractionary ¯scal policies in Italy and analyses e®ects
in a situation without a monetary union. Section 5 combines a monetary union with a
¯scal retrenchment and pinpoints interdependencies between ¯scal policies and interest
and exchange rate impulses caused by the EMU. If they happen at the same time, it is
shown that some of the (negative) e®ects of both policy changes cancel out.
Section 6 summarises ¯ndings and limitations, and derives some policy recommendations.
There are similarities in the underlying macroeconomic situation between Italy and some
of the prospective EMU applicants. Therefore, we infer that the reasoning in the Italian
case can also be applied to the future enlargement of the EMU. Joining the EMU is
likely to produce a dominating interest rate impulse. If there is no undervaluation of the
exchange rate, the overall expansionary e®ect of EMU membership will be even stronger.
Contractionary ¯scal policies at the same time would be advantageous. Given that interest
rates adjust a couple of years prior to the actual start of the EMU, contractionary ¯scal
policies could already be phased in at that time. Given that the Stability Pact is not fully
working, it is then argued that prospective EMU candidates should not be required to
consolidate their ¯nances prior to any adjustment of nominal interest rates; instead, ¯scal
retrenchment policies should be conducted at the time a country is credibly believed to
join the union in the near future.
2 Experiment Design
Main Model and Simulation Characteristics
The simulation analysis presented in this paper is based on a 1991 variant of MULTIMOD
(cf. IMF, 1991), an annual econometric multi-country model. It was developed by the
International Monetary Fund and is widely used for international policy analysis (as de-
scribed in Masson, Symansky, and Meredith, 1990). 470 equations depict ten countries and
regional blocs: the seven G7 countries, the rest of the OECD, the oil exporters, and the
rest of the developing world. MULTIMOD incorporates rational expectations (in ¯nan-
cial markets and the decision-making by ¯rms and households) and complete information.
5This means it is a perfect foresight model requiring perfect credibility of policy decisions
(e.g. on membership in a monetary union as well as on its monetary and ¯scal policies).
MULTIMOD follows \the prevailing paradigm in which a broadly neoclassical view of mac-
roeconomic equilibrium coexists with a new Keynesian view of short-to-medium term ad-
justment" (Mitchell, Sault, Smith and Wallis, 1998). It is a modi¯ed (dynamic) Mundell-
Fleming model combining short run demand determination and IS-LM structure with
long run steady state properties determined by capital accumulation and aggregate sup-
ply. In°ation dynamics depend on capacity utilisation (a Phillips curve type relationship),
imported in°ation e®ects, sticky prices, and a forward-looking component. However, for
the long run, nominal neutrality obtains, because short run nominal rigidities are smoothed
out over time. MULTIMOD accounts for stocks of debt, money, and net foreign assets as
well as for international trade and ¯nancial °ows.6 In the following sections, the transmis-
sion of policy will be described in detail.
The model is used to conduct a counterfactual analysis. A benchmark scenario, the histor-
ical baseline, is compared to various alternative scenarios, to a monetary union (in section
3), to contractionary ¯scal policy (in section 4) and to ¯scal policy under monetary union
(in section 5). In principle, we can choose between ex post and ex ante simulations (Wallis,
1988, p. 226). The former are based on a historical time period (and historical baseline
data), the latter on the future (and, hence, forecast baseline data). However, the impact
of joining a monetary union can only be captured adequately by ex post simulations be-
cause historical baseline data reveal important asymmetries which are less clear in model
forecasts (as used in econometric multi-country models in general and in MULTIMOD in
particular). Forecasts for the immediate future typically represent an adjustment path to
a steady state equilibrium. Once the steady state is reached, interest and exchange rates
are constant, and interest rates are equal across countries. Participating in or joining a
monetary union would, therefore, not produce interest and exchange rate changes. Nor
would induced e®ects appear in such an ex ante analysis. First, the introduction of a
monetary union could not have an interest equalisation e®ect. Second, underlying appre-
ciations and depreciations in the historical baseline would not feature in a steady state
baseline. Hence, there could not be any e®ects caused by changes in exchange rate expec-
6 A more complete description of the model can be found in Masson, Symansky, and Meredith (1990).
It includes theoretical underpinnings, estimation details (univariate, multivariate, pooled estimations;
error correction models; calibrations), examples for using MULTIMOD in policy analyses, and standard
simulation exercises illustrating the properties of the model. Inter alia cf. Bohn (1997) for a stylised core
model of MULTIMOD, and Mitchell, Sault, Smith and Wallis (1998) as well as Bryant, Hooper and Mann
(1993) for comparisons with other multi-country models.
6tations which are induced by a monetary union. Third, it could not be demonstrated that
interest and exchange rate e®ects are typically countervailing.
To evaluate e®ects for Italy, it is preferable, therefore, to use an ex post analysis (based on
historical data) instead of the seemingly more realistic scenario for the EMU starting in
1999 (which, soon after its start, is ex ante from the perspective of any existing simulation
model). Based on the same argument, the enlargement of the EMU (starting some time
in the future) cannot be captured adequately based on ex ante simulations.
Simulation Scenarios
There are also reasons for choosing a particular historical time period for analysing the
e®ects of becoming a member of the EMU. The 1980s are preferred to the 1990s. After
1983, the European Monetary System (EMS) was fairly stable in comparison to the previ-
ous period, and there was no realignment between 1987 and 1992. In contrast, monetary
turmoil with the break-up of the Exchange Rate Mechanism and ensuing exchange rate
instability, especially for the Lira, could be observed in 1992. Moreover, from 1983, GDP
growth rates were positive and very close to one another in the large real world EMU
member countries Italy, France, and Germany (baseline data is shown in the appendix; in
Britain business cycles followed a somewhat di®erent pattern). Hence, possible recession
or overheating e®ects caused by the hypothetical introduction of a monetary union cannot
be blamed on divergent underlying business cycles of the historical baseline.
Nonetheless, by choosing the historical conditions of the 1980s as the point of reference,
considerable nominal disparities among European countries (much larger than in the 1990s)
are incorporated in the analysis. Due to historically large interest rate di®erentials between
prospective EMU member countries and exchange rates far away from Purchasing Power
Parity (Hill, 1986), large adjustments (particularly in Italy) are induced by the hypotheti-
cal introduction of a monetary union in the 1980s. There are three consequences: First,
simulation results exaggerate e®ects compared to those observed and expected for the real
world EMU before and after 1999. Second, quantitative outcomes are less ambiguous,
thus facilitating qualitative interpretations. Moreover, synchronised business cycles and
large nominal disparities provide ideal conditions for analysing transmission mechanisms
of macroeconomic e®ects that are caused by a monetary union. Third, the underlying mac-
roeconomic conditions in Italy correspond more closely to those of some of the prospective
EMU member countries. Thus, the Italian case provides lessons for the enlargement of
the EMU.
7Based on the outlined ex post analysis, it remains to specify the baseline scenario and the
alternative scenarios. Basically, the baseline scenario is de¯ned by model speci¯cations in
MULTIMOD to capture the historical real world situation. Alternative scenarios refer to
(i) the hypothetical introduction of a European monetary union in 1983 (henceforth CP
scenario7); (ii) more or less contractionary ¯scal policy in Italy (henceforth lax, moderate
and tight ¯scal-baseline scenarios); or (iii) a combination of both (henceforth lax, moderate
and tight ¯scal-CP scenarios). All scenarios di®er with respect to ¯scal policy and/or
monetary policy and the exchange rate regime. Both the CP and the ¯scal-CP scenarios
are called hypothetical EMU scenarios. The hypothetical EMU is modeled to consist of
Germany, France and Italy, but not the smaller European countries, because they are not
accounted for separately in the version of MULTIMOD used for this paper.
The start of the hypothetical EMU in 1983 is preceded by a one year announcement period
(1982). It may be argued that { for most countries { markets predicted EMU membership
more than a year in advance, and that future applications for membership will be known
at least two years in advance. However, since MULTIMOD requires perfect credibility and
full information, the most realistic assumption is to limit the announcement period to one
year. As a consequence, real world anticipation e®ects may be exaggerated by simulation
results, because expectations switch abruptly from one (annual) period to the next and
all adjustments are squeezed into one period only.
3 Monetary Union
Interest Rates
In the baseline model, the behaviour of the Bundesbank and those central banks { like
the US Federal Reserve { which do not participate in the European Exchange Rate Mech-
anism (ERM) is described by monetary targeting. All other ERM member countries are
assumed to commit to exchange rate targeting vis-µ a-vis the DM. Once the hypothetical
EMU has started, the nominal interest rate in member countries is no longer determined
by a national interest rate reaction function, but by the interest rate reaction function of
the hypothetical ECB. The ECB commits to monetary targeting. There is no conceptual
change like, for instance, a switch to in°ation targeting. The common European interest
rate is modeled as the instrument, and the European money stock as the (intermediate)
7 The name originates from the chosen procedure for ¯xing EMU conversion rates at the central parity
(CP) rates of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). See next section.
8target for obtaining its price stability objective. As for previously national central banks,











The change of the union-wide common interest rate (iU ¡iU
¡1) depends on the aggregation
of the quantity of European money MU (money refers to demand and supply in MULTI-
MOD), and on the construction of exogenous European monetary target mtU (see below).
Under the assumption of behavioural invariability, the negative coe±cient r is unchanged
from national equations (r is identical across countries), and, more importantly, the aggre-






(As de¯ned further down, e
k;U
t¸1983 is the ¯xed conversion rate in the union used here to
express the quantity of money for each member country k in terms of Euro, the common
currency in the union.)
The monetary stability orientation of a central bank is expressed by the time path of its
exogenous monetary target (mtt). Given the level of money MU in equation 1, the Eu-
ropean interest rate is determined by (changes in) the monetary stability orientation of
the hypothetical ECB. Once the hypothetical EMU has started, an expansionary (contrac-
tionary) policy { implying lower (higher) union-wide interest rates { is caused by increasing
(lowering) the level of mtU relative to the level of MU.
EMU means { by de¯nition of a monetary union { a single monetary policy, but allows for
various levels of union-wide monetary stability orientation. In the approach chosen, the
'intermediate' monetary policy stance of the hypothetical EMU is based on the average of
historical national monetary stability orientations which correspond to the development of
actual money supply in the historical baseline. The hypothetical European monetary tar-






This is analogous to the aggregation of the European money stock, MU.
This approach may be criticised from two angles. First, simply adding up national target
values given in the baseline of MULTIMOD is a crude way for describing the hypothetical
ECB policy as an average of historical European monetary policies. Nonetheless, this
procedure su±ces to capture a crucial feature of any monetary union, the equalisation of
short term nominal interest rates. Second, the real world EMU is expected to conduct
a more stability-oriented monetary policy. However, any speci¯cation of the European
stability orientation is arbitrary as long as we cannot observe the actual monetary policy
9of the real world ECB. Moreover, (qualitative) ¯ndings of this study do not depend on a
realistic modelisation of the ECB behaviour.
On a theoretical level, the transition to a common monetary policy in the hypothetical
EMU { based on average monetary stability orientation { can be expected to produce
average interest rates across the union from 1983 onwards. Relative to national baseline
rates, interest rates fall in some countries and go up in others thereby a®ecting interest-
sensitive national money demand (hence MU) as well as the real side. Some countries
are likely to experience contractionary, others expansionary e®ects. Hence mere averaging
of the monetary stability orientation in Europe produces macroeconomic e®ects in each
member country in each year { relative to the baseline.
However, during the transition to the hypothetical EMU, the link between a change in
monetary stability orientation (relative to the baseline) and a change in interest rates is
not straightforward any more. For instance, higher monetary stability orientation (lower
mt) caused by the transition to the monetary union does not imply higher short term
nominal interest rates and the typical (contractionary) real short run e®ects. Instead,
the structural break causes a shift in each country in the long run relationship between
stability orientation and interest rates: either from high mt and high i to lower mt and
lower i; or vice versa.
More speci¯cally, a country with a historically low monetary stability record (like Italy)
typically exhibits high nominal interest rates in the baseline. Hence, if nominal interest
rates are averaged in the union, they decrease for that country. At the same time, its
monetary stability orientation rises relative to the baseline, i.e. the stability orientation of
the ECB is higher (lower growth rates of mt) by comparison to the (formerly independent)
national central bank. A change in nominal interest rates { relative to the baseline { is
not brought about by an exogenous change of central bank policies. Instead, it is the
endogenous response to joining a monetary union. Therefore, nominal interest rate changes
{ relative to the baseline { are not referred to as shocks, but as interest rate impulses.
Thus far, we have only argued on a theoretical level. But the ¯ndings of nominal interest
rate impulses are con¯rmed by the simulation results for the CP scenario as presented in
appendix B (similarly in appendix D for ¯scal-CP scenarios). The following generalisation
is useful for the discussion of induced e®ects further down in this section:
Observation 1 (Interest Rate Impulse) A member country of a monetary union ex-
periences short term interest rate impulses due to the common monetary policy in the
10union. { Impulses for countries with a low monetary stability record (e.g. Italy) are typi-
cally expansionary.
Overall e®ects for each country depend, however, on two impulses caused by joining a
monetary union: interest rate and exchange rate impulses. For instance, it is shown
further down that the real interest rate does not necessarily go down when the nominal
interest rate decreases because of the countervailing exchange rate impulse.
Exchange Rates
In MULTIMOD, exchange rates are determined by the open interest parity condition
(relative to the US). In the baseline, there are separate exchange rate equations for France,
Germany, and Italy. For the hypothetical EMU scenarios, individual exchange rates for
member countries are replaced by a single Euro-$ rate (and conversion rates are used to ¯x
each national currency to the Euro). The (log) exchange rate of the (hypothetical) Euro
vis-µ a-vis the US-$, eU, depends on two components: the expected (log) Euro-$ exchange
rate for next period EeU
+1 (E is the expectation operator); and the di®erential between the
union-wide short term interest rate iU (determined by the ECB) and the corresponding








Normalising the Euro at 1 DM as of 1983, the start of the hypothetical EMU, reduces the
number of conversion rates needed. French and Italian exchange rates to the Euro (ek;U),
i.e. to the DM (ek;G), are irrevocably ¯xed at (yearly averages of) their previous period















1982. Hence the name CP scenario.8
This largely corresponds to the conversion procedure chosen for the actual EMU at the EU
Summit in May 1998 (EU, 1998): previously determined central parities of the European
Exchange Rate Mechanism were declared to be the "irrevocably ¯xed conversion rates".
Based on these ¯xed conversion rates, Lira and FF exchange rates can be calculated for the
monetary union scenario. CP scenario simulation results presented in appendix B show
8 Two other conversion rate procedures were also examined: ¯xing at purchasing power parity rates
(taken from outside the model), and at market conversion rates (i.e. at bilateral 1982 exchange rates
obtained by simulations). For Italy, however, the same qualitative simulation results obtain.
11that { relative to the baseline { the Lira and the FF appreciate vis-µ a-vis (i) the US-$ as well
as (ii) the DM (similarly in appendix D for ¯scal-CP scenarios). The latter result seems
obvious, because Lira and FF can no longer depreciate in a monetary union as they did in
the historical baseline. Nonetheless, an appreciation vis-µ a-vis the DM does not necessarily
obtain. From 1983, comparative exchange rate impulses between two member currencies
of the hypothetical EMU (k and G) can be represented by a tautology consisting of the

























t (b). It means, for instance, that the Italian Lira vis-µ a-vis the US-$ (ek
t) appreciates {
relative to the baseline { by comparison to the DM-$ rate eG
t . For each year, t, there











. If the exogenously chosen conversion rate corresponds to the 1982 market
rate (or represents a revaluation), then a historically weak currency exhibits a compar-
atively appreciative exchange rate impulse which is reinforced over time (because the
baseline exchange rate depreciates). By imposing a devalued conversion rate, however,
a comparatively depreciative exchange rate impulse could be produced { relative to the
baseline { for a certain period of time after the start of the monetary union. But this is
not realistic for a country like Italy whose economic situation is characterised by an under-
valued currency both in terms of purchasing power parities and in terms of real e®ective
exchange rates (as of the 1980s as well as of the 1990s; cf. Hill, 1986, and OECD, 2002).
Observation 2 (Exchange Rate Impulse) In a monetary union with exogenously ¯xed
conversion rates, there are exchange rate impulses between member countries.
{ Impulses for countries with historically weak currencies (e.g. Italy) are typically com-
paratively appreciative, unless depreciative impulses are produced by imposing (e.g. for
political reasons) an even more unrealistic conversion rate.
Transmission of Impulses
Interest and exchange rate impulses produce macroeconomic e®ects in each country which
participates in the monetary union. Compared to France and Germany, results are more
clear-cut in Italy (cf. ¯gure 1 and appendix B). Nominal appreciations and decreasing
12Figure 1: Transmission of Impulses in Italy
exchange rate impulses:   interest rate impulses:
appreciation interest rate fall
e ¯ ↓        i ¯ ↓
     imp. disinflation      inflation exp. r ¯ ↓
competition  terms-of-trade       „real interest r.“
effect  effect     effect
      TB  ¯ ↓        real YD,W  ­ ↑          real C,I ­ ↑
     real absorption
        C+I+g  ­ ↑
  real GDP  ­ ↑
nominal interest rates produce basically three e®ects: a long-lasting negative (i.e. con-
tractionary) competition e®ect (real e®ective exchange rates appreciate); a long-lasting
positive (i.e. expansionary) terms-of-trade e®ect on wealth and income due to lower im-
port prices; and a real interest rate e®ect that is strongly positive in the short run (real
interest rates are more than 9 % below the baseline in 1983), but dies out in the medium
term.
As a result, Italian GDP is permanently above baseline levels. Despite a build-up of cap-
ital, capacity utilisation increases in the short and medium term (not shown in ¯gure 1,
but in the appendix).9 There are enormous overheating e®ects. The ensuing in°ationary
impact (due to the Phillips curve relationship) is strong enough to overcompensate im-
ported disin°ation e®ects (which are caused by the nominal appreciation). Since prices
are sticky, future in°ation goes up as well, so do in°ation expectations ( ^ P e) due to ratio-
nal expectations. Hence the impact of decreasing nominal interest rates (i) is reinforced,
9 In MULTIMOD, capital accumulation rests on Tobin's q-theory. The market value of capital is the
stream of capital income discounted by prevailing real interest rates. Supply side e®ects are accounted for
because the capital stock determines capacity output (labour supply is exogenous) and, thereby, a®ects
capacity utilisation. { The decisive role of capacity utilisation for in°ation is again con¯rmed by Corrado
and Mattay (1997).
13so that the real interest rate (r) e®ect on consumption (C) and investment (I) must be
positive and very strong (government spending g is exogenous). This is further augmented
by positive terms of trade e®ects (real disposable income Y D and wealth W go up). The
overall impact on GDP remains positive despite the negative competition e®ect on the
trade balance (TB) caused by falling exchange rates (e) and rising in°ation.
In France, similar e®ects occur. In both countries, initial interest and exchange rate e®ects
are countervailing. However, French GDP goes down in the short run as well as in the
longer term (after 10 years) relative to the baseline, because the exchange rate impulse is
stronger than in Italy and dominates. Since interest rates equalise in the monetary union,
Italy enjoys { compared to France { a more drastic decrease from historically high interest
rate peaks.
In Germany, the situation resembles Italian conditions, but with opposite signs. Con-
tractionary e®ects caused by increased interest rates { relative to the baseline { dominate
because exchange rate impulses are weak. In nominal terms, the DM depreciates { relative
to the baseline { vis-µ a-vis the Lira and the FF, but there is a countervailing exchange rate
e®ect until 1986, because the DM appreciates vis-µ a-vis the US-$ { relative to the baseline.
Nonetheless, in all countries overall results can be explained by the relative importance of
nominal interest and nominal exchange rate impulses despite (cyclical) dynamics produced
by price stickiness and capacity utilisation e®ects.
Observation 3 (Real E®ects) Real macroeconomic e®ects for individual countries form-
ing or joining a monetary union depend on real interest rate e®ects and various terms of
trade e®ects (competition, income, and wealth e®ects). They are caused by interest and
exchange rate impulses and a potential trade-o® between them.
4 Fiscal Policy
Modeling Fiscal Retrenchment
Protocol 5 of the Maastricht Treaty speci¯es the so-called ¯scal convergence criteria of
the EMU: a debt-to-GDP ratio of not more than 60 % and a ratio of the government
budget de¯cit to GDP of not more than 3 % in each member country. Before discussing
¯scal consolidation programs by EMU member countries, however, it is useful to analyse
the e®ects of such retrenchment policies in a situation without a monetary union. More
14speci¯cally, the macroeconomic e®ects of tax-¯nanced debt and de¯cit reductions are ex-
amined.10 Adjustment policies are modeled to start in 1982, but compliance with the
Maastricht Criteria takes us well beyond 1983 (the start year of the hypothetical EMU).
In MULTIMOD, the average tax rate t governs tax revenues thereby a®ecting government
debt and de¯cit. The original (baseline) tax rate equation is a feedback rule based on the
deviation of endogenous debt and de¯cit levels from exogenous target values. Since these
(variable) targets represent the actual development of debt and de¯cit in the historical
baseline, any departure from the baseline leads to a tax rate response. In the modi¯ed tax
rate reaction function used here, ¯xed ratios of nominal debt (B) and de¯cit (B ¡B¡1) to
nominal GDP (GDP n) are targeted explicitly (to capture the Maastricht requirements):
t = t¡1 + ¿1 ¤
µ B





GDP n ¡ 0:03
!
(4)
Since France and Germany do not exceed the Maastricht debt and de¯cit limits, ¯scal con-




GDPn , respectively) exceed their exogenous target at the outset, the
tax rate goes up in the ¯rst years (depending on exogenous response parameters ¿1 and
¿2 which are explained further down). Typically, raising government revenues eventually
pushes the de¯cit ratio below its target. Nonetheless, the tax rate continues to rise as long
as the tax rate increasing e®ect of the debt component (above its target ratio) outweighs
the tax rate decreasing e®ect of the de¯cit component (below its target ratio). When the
debt ratio approaches its target value (but is still above), the de¯cit ratio (still below tar-
get) dominates, thus causing the tax rate to go down again. A relatively smooth landing
is achieved. Once the initial adjustment has been completed, the development of debt and
de¯cit is cyclical, but stays near target ratios.
This ¯scal consolidation rule allows for °exible policy responses; there are no pre-speci¯ed
debt or de¯cit levels (or ratios) that must be achieved at a particular point in time during
the adjustment process. If the weights of response parameters ¿1 (= 0:04) and ¿2 (= 0:3)
are taken from the baseline tax rate function, the ¯scal consolidation plan is henceforth
called \moderate". For Italy with almost 40 % above the debt target and more than 6 %
above the de¯cit target in the 1980s, both (debt and de¯cit) terms in the tax rate reaction
10 It is not intended to evaluate the e±ciency of alternative debt reduction strategies. Hughes Hallett
and McAdam (1998a/b) ¯nd that tax increases are more e®ective than expenditure cuts. In contrast,
Alesina and Perotti (1995a/b), for instance, argue that \... tax increases (particularly labour and social
security taxes) lead to a fall in competitiveness, as wage demands increase to compensate for an increased
¯scal pressure...". { Mitchell, Sault and Wallis, (2000) analyse alternative debt and de¯cit reduction tax
rules for alternative macromodels including MULTIMOD.
15function carry a similar weight. Hence limited changes of relative weights (in opposite
directions) hardly a®ect the simulation outcome. To obtain results for tighter or laxer
tax rate reactions, it su±ces to change response parameters proportionately. Henceforth,
\tight" refers to ¿1 = 0:0666 and ¿2 = 0:5 (baseline values multiplied by 5
3), \lax" to ¿1 =
0:0133 and ¿2 = 0:1 (multiplied by 1
3). Once again, ¯scal consolidation strategies for Italy
under baseline conditions are called lax, moderate, or tight ¯scal-baselines. Analogously,
lax, moderate or tight ¯scal-CP scenarios refer to ¯scal consolidation programs for Italy
under hypothetical EMU conditions (with exchange rates ¯xed at central parities (CP);
cf. next section).
Results
Results discussed here mainly refer to lax and tight consolidation programs (cf. appendix
C). The focus is on Italy, because other countries are practically not a®ected. As for the
lax ¯scal-baseline, the average tax rate in Italy rises, temporarily, by up to 5.6 percentage
points above the baseline. Targets are achieved in 1989 for the de¯cit ratio and in 1992
for the debt ratio. Relative to the (original) baseline, the de¯cit ratio declines gradually,
whereas debt-to-GDP actually rises until 1985, because the denominator (nominal GDP)
falls by more than the nominal debt. In fact, there is a sharp decline in real GDP in the
¯rst years of the adjustment program. A recovery period in the medium term (with GDP
just above baseline levels in 1989) is followed by another downturn from 1990 onwards.
Capacity utilisation is also reduced relative to the baseline (until 1986), because the loss
in actual output (GDP) exceeds the reduction in capacity output caused by a shrinking
stock of capital (reduced investment; cf. footnote 9, page 13). At lower levels of capacity
utilisation, in°ation rates, too, remain under their corresponding baseline values during
these ¯rst years of the ¯scal consolidation phase. Despite rising in°ation rates, thereafter,
the price level is still below its baseline value by 1993.
How can the changes in economic activity relative to the (original) baseline be explained?
The ¯scal consolidation program produces contractionary primary e®ects through real
disposable income and real wealth. Income is reduced throughout the simulation horizon
(until 1993), because elevated tax burdens diminish (real) net-of-tax labour and capital
income relative to the baseline. At the same time, simulation results show that total
(real) private sector wealth is unambiguously reduced permanently relative to the baseline.
Nonetheless, wealth is a®ected by countervailing e®ects which are not quanti¯ed in the
following brief discussion. On the one hand, the present value of the stream of current
and future after-tax capital and labour income may be higher than under original baseline
16conditions (despite lower capital and labour income in early periods) because lower tax
rates are required in future periods once the debt burden has been successfully reduced.
Also, (real) net foreign assets are build up compared to baseline levels (see discussion
below). On the other hand, there is { relative to the baseline { a reduction in the real stock
of money (see discussion below) and, particularly, in public holdings of real government
debt.
Reduced wealth and income levels cause a decrease in investment and consumption in
most years (despite lower real interest rates from 1987 onwards). Since aggregate demand
decreases faster than capacity output, there is a strong disin°ation { as already discussed
in the previous section. Changes in price levels and in°ation rates produce secondary
e®ects relative to the baseline: competition e®ects (measured in terms of real e®ective
exchange rates) and real interest rate e®ects. The competition e®ect is countervailing to
the income and wealth e®ects. It is expansionary for the entire period until 1993. It
originates in reduced price levels (nominal exchange rates in the ERM practically do not
change) and leads to a real depreciation relative to the baseline, an improvement of the
trade balance, and a lasting build up of net foreign assets.
Real interest rates (contractionary until 1986, expansionary thereafter) are basically driven
by (rationally expected) next period in°ation rates, because nominal interest rates hardly
change. Under (baseline and) ¯scal-baseline conditions nominal interest rates can hardly
change, because Italy is a member of the ERM adhering to exchange rate targeting vis-µ a-vis
the DM. Interest rates are only reduced, because there are (relatively small) contractionary
spill-overs into Germany. Lower economic activity in Germany { relative to the baseline
{ causes reductions of German private sector real money holdings. Given that monetary
targets of the Bundesbank are not changed from (exogenous) baseline target values for
the nominal money stock, there is some automatic monetary loosening. To stay close to
the central parities of the ERM, the Italian central bank must also reduce interest rates
slightly (even less than in Germany).
To counterbalance the economic slump in most years { relative to the baseline { caused
by the ¯scal consolidation plan, some (discretionary) monetary loosening as suggested
by Hughes Hallett and McAdam (1998a and b) would certainly have a stimulating e®ect
on aggregate demand. Along these lines, it would be recommendable from a national
perspective to leave the ERM so that expansionary monetary policies could be pursued.
However, if ¯scal consolidations produce expansionary e®ects in later years (as obtained
for a moderate ¯scal consolidation plan), monetary tightening would then seem advisable
to preserve disin°ation gains which were accrued in earlier years.
17Under a tighter ¯scal consolidation plan, the outcome di®ers. The targeted debt ratio is
reached in 1988, four years earlier; the de¯cit ratio is almost at its target by 1983, the
start year of the hypothetical EMU. To achieve this, taxes reach their peak as early as
1985 with 7.8 percentage points above the baseline (compared to +5.6 % in 1990 under
the lax plan). As a result, the contractionary income e®ect { relative to the baseline { is
stronger at ¯rst, but turns expansionary in 1991. Compared to the lax consolidation plan,
the contractionary real wealth e®ect is weaker at ¯rst, but deteriorates thereafter (due to
a steeper rise in in°ation rates). The positive competition e®ect occurs sooner because of
powerful disin°ation e®ects, but weakens when in°ation grows faster than under the lax
¯scal-baseline. For the same reason, real interest rates rise by more until 1986 and drop
more sharply thereafter.
Compared to lax ¯scal policies in Italy, there is more volatility in growth rates, in°ation,
and real interest rates { relative to the original baseline. Overall, there are stag°ationary
e®ects (compared to contraction and disin°ation e®ects under the lax ¯scal-baseline). By
1993, GDP is reduced by more than 1 % relative to the baseline, but prices are some 6 %
higher. The contractionary e®ect is larger in the early years due to stronger contractionary
income and real interest rate e®ects { compared to the lax plan. In the medium term, a
strong expansionary real interest rate e®ect (relative to the baseline) dominates and makes
up for the higher GDP losses in the earlier years. At lower levels of capacity output, the
strong expansion leads to higher in°ation rates though (according to the Phillips curve
relationship). Towards the end of the reported period, the real interest rate actually rises
above baseline rates again (to start another cycle) and the wealth position worsens, but
additional in°ation (on top of baseline in°ation) is reduced only gradually.
Interpretation
Policy recommendations for ¯scal consolidation programs ought to account for the role
of supply side e®ects under laxer and tighter ¯scal-baseline scenarios. Tighter ¯scal con-
solidations cause a more severe depletion of capital and a stronger reduction of capacity
output in the short run. When GDP grows again in the medium term, capacity utilisa-
tion is much higher under a tighter ¯scal strategy. Hence price levels (and in most cases
in°ation rates, too) are more unfavourable over an extended period of time. In 1993 (only
as an example), the price level di®erence between the lax and the tight strategy amounts
to 10 %, even though GDP levels are similar. From the perspective of this study, lax or
moderate ¯scal contractions are recommendable due to their limited supply side e®ects.
18Despite these di®erences, the comparison of laxer and tighter consolidation programs for
Italy in a historical simulation period (until 1993) reveals a clear pattern of e®ects and ag-
gregate outcomes for all ¯scal strategies. Relative to the baseline, there is an expansionary
competition e®ect, a contractionary wealth and income e®ect (cf. page 16), and a change
of sign for the real interest e®ect around 1986/87 from contractionary to expansionary.
Irrespective of the actual ¯scal consolidation program, the real interest rate e®ect has a
decisive impact on the outcome, even though income and wealth e®ects ignite the adjust-
ment process. Under all strategies, there are short term losses, but aggregate demand rises
above the baseline in the medium run. If the consolidation program is tighter, cyclical
swings are larger and the ¯rst peak occurs sooner. The following observation summaries
these empirical results:
Observation 4 (Fiscal Consolidations) Irrespective of the tightness of tax rate re-
sponses to achieve targeted debt and de¯cit ratios, macroeconomic e®ects of ¯scal consoli-
dations conducted by Italy show the same pattern. They cause primary income and wealth
e®ects (contractionary) which, in turn, produce competition e®ects (expansionary) and de-
cisive real interest rate e®ects (contractionary ¯rst, then expansionary). The outcome is
contractionary in the short run, but expansionary in the medium run.
Comparing transmission impacts described here (obtaining under a ¯scal-baseline) to those
resulting from the CP scenario (cf. section 3 and ¯gure 1) reveals some fundamental
di®erences. Fiscal consolidations trigger changes in income and wealth (one of the three
aforementioned transmission e®ects) which immediately spread to the other transmission
e®ects. In contrast, under the CP scenario, the three transmission e®ects are induced by
(additional) impulses in terms of changes in nominal interest and exchange rates.
The role of nominal variables (prices, exchange, and interest rates) can be scrutinised in
more detail. First, under both sets of scenarios, prices and in°ation rates play a central
role in the dynamics of the economies. However, under the CP scenario (cf. section 3),
changes in in°ation are strongly a®ected by imported in°ation, whereas here, they are
almost exclusively determined by capacity utilisation e®ects (according to the Phillips
curve relationship). Second, under the CP scenario, the competition e®ect hinges on
changes in nominal exchange rates; here, price changes are the main cause. Finally, under
the CP scenario, real interest rates result from a trade-o® between changes in nominal
interest rates and expected in°ation. In contrast, nominal interest rates are practically
not a®ected by ¯scal consolidation policies (under baseline conditions otherwise), so that
expected in°ation governs real interest rates.
195 Fiscal Retrenchment in the EMU
Interdependencies between Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union
The joint macroeconomic e®ects of ¯scal retrenchment policies and joining a monetary
union (cf. appendix D) can be largely explained by \adding up" results for ¯scal strategies
per se (¯scal-baseline; cf. section 4) and those for the CP scenario per se (cf. section 3).
However, interdependencies between ¯scal consolidations in Italy and the hypothetical
EMU do a®ect the overall outcome of ¯scal-CP scenarios in several respects. On the one
hand, hypothetical EMU conditions impinge on ¯scal policies: di®erences of lax, moderate,
and tight ¯scal strategies become indistinct and alternative ¯scal strategies amount to
similar debt and de¯cit reductions (in terms of ratios to GDP). On the other hand, ¯scal
policies also a®ect the outcome of the hypothetical EMU: (i), all ¯scal strategies produce
a similar impact on interest and exchange rate impulses; and (ii), induced changes to
exchange rate impulses entail an additional expansionary e®ect in all member countries.
Once these interdependencies have been analysed, the overall impact on real GDP of a
¯scal retrenchment in the hypothetical EMU is discussed.
As for the impact of hypothetical EMU conditions on ¯scal contractions, tax rates of any
¯scal-CP scenario are lower than those under the corresponding ¯scal-baseline. Peak rates
occur two to three years earlier, and they are more than 3.5 percentage points lower. The
reason is that the EMU produces an expansionary e®ect on aggregate output in Italy (cf.
section 3), which contributes to the reduction of debt-to-GDP and de¯cit-to-GDP ratios
so that smaller tax rises are required.
Since deviations from debt and de¯cit ratio targets produce stronger tax rate responses
for tighter ¯scal rules, tax rates are reduced by more under a tighter ¯scal-CP scenario
compared to its corresponding ¯scal-baseline, even though the expansionary e®ect caused
by the hypothetical EMU is the same under all ¯scal strategies. As a result, the di®erence
between the peak tax rates of lax, moderate, and tight ¯scal strategies is 0.5 percentage
points smaller under ¯scal-CP scenarios compared to those under the ¯scal-baseline. Fur-
thermore, it is shown further down (cf. real GDP in ¯gure 3) that the overall outcome
of ¯scal-CP scenarios does practically not depend on the strictness of the underlying tax
rule.
These ¯ndings can be explained by the role of the denominator in debt and de¯cit ratios:
20Observation 5 (Denominator E®ect under Fiscal-CP Scenarios)
If Italy joins the EMU and pursues ¯scal retrenchment policies at the same time, there
is a strong denominator e®ect, i.e. a reduction of debt and de¯cit ratios merely caused
by output expansions induced by the hypothetical EMU. { Despite di®erences in tightness,
alternative tax rate responses in Italy (to achieve targeted debt and de¯cit ratios) produce
similar e®ects on debt and de¯cit ratios under the ¯scal-CP scenario.
Impact of Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union
As to the impact of ¯scal consolidations on the hypothetical EMU, consider nominal
interest and exchange rate impulses under any ¯scal-CP scenario. Exchange rates vis-µ a-
vis the US-$ are higher in Italy, but also in the other hypothetical EMU member countries {
compared to the original CP scenario (cf. ¯gure 2). This is due to monetary loosening over
an extended period of time caused by the ¯scal contractions in Italy. The basic mechanism
rests on changes to money demand and di®erent responses of central banks under di®erent
scenarios. In a situation without monetary union (i.e. under a ¯scal-baseline scenario),
Italy is part of the ERM and her central bank targets the exchange rate vis-µ a-vis the
DM. Under such conditions, ¯scal consolidations in Italy produce lasting reductions in the
nominal money demand, which do not trigger direct interest rate responses by the Italian
central bank to restore the initial volume of nominal money in the economy (as argued in
section 4).
By contrast, under a ¯scal-CP scenario there is monetary targeting conducted by the
ECB (based on an exogenous aggregate nominal money supply target). Reductions in
the union-wide nominal money demand (merely caused by the ¯scal contraction in Italy)
induce automatic monetary loosening (reduced interest rates) { relative to the baseline {
in all hypothetical EMU countries such that the e®ect on the nominal money demand is
limited. Hence the level of nominal money is higher in the longer term under a ¯scal-CP
scenario { compared to the corresponding ¯scal-baseline (where monetary policy does not
respond to the reduction in money demand). Moreover, reduced interest rates (relative
to the baseline) produce a depreciative e®ect on exchange rates according to the open
interest parity condition. For lax, moderate, and tight ¯scal-CP scenarios, the change in
exchange rates (relative to the baseline) is about 5 percentage points smaller than under
the original CP scenario (relative to the baseline).
21Figure 2: Nominal Exchange Rates in Italy
under Lax and Tight Fiscal-CP Scenarios
(a)
(b)
22Observation 6 (Exchange Rate Impulse under Fiscal-CP Scenarios)
Irrespective of the tightness of tax rate responses, ¯scal consolidations in Italy produce an
additional depreciative impact on nominal exchange rate impulses. Over an extended pe-
riod of time, exchange rates are higher in all member countries because of lower interest
rates in the union. As a result, there is an additional expansionary competition e®ect over
and above e®ects caused by the ¯scal strategy and by the hypothetical EMU on their own.
A more expansionary monetary policy by the hypothetical ECB should be re°ected by
larger interest rate impulses in Italy, i.e. union-wide nominal interest rates should be
lower under a ¯scal-CP compared to the original CP scenario. This is true for most years,
but not for the ¯rst years of the hypothetical EMU. From 1983 to 1986, a paradoxical
result obtains: interest rates are higher than under the original CP scenario. This is so
despite the contractionary impact of higher taxes which should cause automatic monetary
loosening (given that there is an exogenous nominal monetary target for the hypothetical
ECB). However, since exchange rates are higher compared to the original CP scenario,
prices and in°ation are higher, too (due to imported in°ation e®ects on the one hand, and
a more positive competition e®ect leading to higher GDP, higher capacity utilisation and
an additional in°ation e®ect based on the Phillips curve relationship on the other hand).
When GDP and prices go up, the public desires to increase its nominal money holdings.
The central bank, however, tries to bring them down again (to the level of the exogenous
nominal monetary target) by raising nominal interest rates.
Since changes of the exchange rate impulse are almost identical under di®erent ¯scal
strategies, the impact on interest rates is very similar, too. For all ¯scal-CP scenarios,
interest rates are (approximately 0.5 %) higher than those of the original CP scenario
in the ¯rst three to four years of the hypothetical EMU, but below thereafter. It should
though be remarked that { under all ¯scal-CP scenarios { the impact of changes in nominal
interest rates on real rates is practically eliminated by the aforementioned higher rate of
(expected) in°ation.
Real E®ects
As for the overall impact on real GDP of various ¯scal consolidation strategies under
hypothetical EMU conditions, consider ¯gure 3. In separate ¯gures for Italy, France, and
Germany, GDP levels { under various scenarios { are presented as ratios to baseline values.
The ¯gures con¯rm that { for each country { the simulated outcome for all ¯scal strategies
is very similar. For Italy, ¯scal contractions lead to short term losses in aggregate output
23Figure 3: Real GDP in Italy, France, and Germany




24(of up to 1.5 % in 1984) { compared to the original CP scenario. These losses would be even
larger without the additional expansionary e®ect stemming from the more depreciative
exchange rate impulses under ¯scal-CP conditions compared to the original CP scenario.
Cycles are dampened and there is an overall loss of about 1 % by 1993 compared to the
original CP scenario. (Even thereafter, the magnitude of the relative loss does not change
much.) At the same time, in°ation is also reduced. The price level in 1993 is between 3
% to 4 % lower under any ¯scal-CP scenario compared to the original CP scenario.
In France and Germany, the situation is more favourable compared to the original CP
scenario. Losses stemming from the hypothetical EMU are reduced in the short run
as well as in the longer term due to less appreciative/more depreciative exchange rate
impulses. Cycles are dampened in these countries (as in Italy). Over the longer term,
losses occurring under the original CP scenario are reduced by more than 0.5 % and 0.3
% in France and Germany, respectively (even beyond 1993). This comes at the cost of
higher price levels in each country in 1993 (some 2.5 % higher compared to the original
CP scenario).
In all countries, impulses, transmission e®ects, and the potential interest-exchange trade-
o® brought out in section 3 remain the same, qualitatively, under all ¯scal-CP scenarios.
However, the trade-o® between nominal interest and exchange rate impulses turns more
expansionary in all countries under any ¯scal-CP scenario due to the more depreciative
exchange rate impulse. Nonetheless, the ¯scal contraction does take a toll in Italy under
all ¯scal-CP scenarios in terms of reduced aggregate output. (On the other hand, longer
term in°ation ¯gures improve.)
Observation 7 (Real E®ects under Fiscal-CP Scenarios)
Under any ¯scal consolidation program conducted by Italy in the hypothetical EMU, the
interest-exchange trade-o® observed under the original CP scenario is retained, qualita-
tively. Due to interdependencies between ¯scal consolidations and the hypothetical EMU,
there are, however, additional real e®ects caused by: a denominator e®ect (observation 5)
and more expansionary exchange rate impulses (observation 6).
Real e®ects of ¯scal consolidations on the hypothetical EMU (observation 7) can now be
compared to the impact of ¯scal consolidations on the baseline (cf. section 4). For Italy,
a ¯scal consolidation plan under hypothetical EMU conditions (¯scal-CP) produces { as
already seen { fairly little output volatility, but results in an overall loss in the longer
term (after 10 years) { relative to the corresponding original CP scenario. In contrast, a
25¯scal retrenchment under baseline conditions (¯scal-baseline) induces considerable output
volatility, but may cause both contractionary or expansionary e®ects in the longer term
{ relative to the original baseline. (Whereas lax and tight strategies { under baseline
conditions otherwise { lead to output losses, the moderate ¯scal plan produces increased
output of +0.8 % by 1993 at almost no additional in°ation.) At the same time, short run
contractions in Italy { observed for a ¯scal retrenchment plan under baseline conditions
otherwise { are reduced under hypothetical EMU conditions (relative to the original CP
scenario) due to a denominator e®ect (observation 5) and more expansionary exchange
rate impulses (observation 6). France and Germany enjoy favourable e®ects if Italy con-
ducts her ¯scal consolidation under hypothetical EMU conditions, whereas they are hardly
a®ected under baseline conditions.
6 Conclusion
In a counterfactual simulation experiment, e®ects of forming a monetary union and chang-
ing ¯scal policies are analysed. Four scenarios are compared: the historical baseline, the
formation of a hypothetical monetary union, hypothetical contractionary ¯scal policies in
one of the member countries, and the combination of both assumptions (formation of a
monetary union joint with contractionary ¯scal policies). The case study type analysis is
based on real world data and produces the following results for Italy. On the one hand, the
hypothetical EMU per se generates expansionary e®ects overall: an expansionary interest
rate impulse dominates a contractionary exchange rate impulse. On the other hand, ¯scal
retrenchment policies per se cause short term contractionary e®ects (as is well-known).
If, however, the ¯scal retrenchment and the joining of the monetary union happen at
the same time, the overall results are determined by three ¯ndings. First, the ¯scal con-
traction and the EMU-induced expansion are countervailing, but overall expansionary.
Second, the expansion (caused by the interest rate impulse) reduces de¯cit-to-GDP and
debt-to-GDP ratios in any case (denominator e®ect), thus facilitating the ¯scal contrac-
tion. Third, there is some additional help from the monetary side (i.e. there are more
favourable exchange rate impulses), if the European Central Bank sticks to a pre-speci¯ed
nominal monetary target. Overall, it can be shown, therefore, that joining the EMU o®ers
favourable conditions for ¯scal consolidations in a country like Italy.
Obviously, these ¯ndings rest on a number of assumptions made in the underlying model,
on a speci¯c class of ¯scal consolidation programs for Italy (based on a tax rate reaction
function), and on the application of ¯scal strategies to hypothetical EMU scenarios as
26de¯ned in this paper. They are also based on a country that is characterised by an
undervalued currency (relative to purchasing power parity; cf. Hill, 1986), high nominal
interest rates as well as 'excessive' budget de¯cits and debt { as captured by the historical
baseline as of the 1980s.
If it were intended to obtain results that can be directly applied to the real world EMU
which began on 1 January 1999, it could also be criticised that the simulation exercise is
based on the economic conditions of the 1980s. The debt problem in Italy in the 1980s
resembles the situation in the wake of the real world EMU, but interest and exchange rate
impulses are clearly overstated. Moreover, ¯scal consolidations are only simulated for one
country, whereas most countries made considerable ¯scal e®orts in the run-up to and in
the ¯rst few years of the actual EMU as of 1999.
Most criticisms are, however, not relevant, if the ¯ndings are interpreted di®erently. As
emphasised before this paper is not interested in quantitative results, but in the underlying
e®ects. For given constellations of interest and exchange rates the paper produces clear-
cut qualitative results: what are the e®ects of contractionary ¯scal policies in countries
joining a monetary union? In answering this question it is important, however, that
our judgement of the interest rate constellation is based on the di®erential between the
joining country and the union prior to any anticipation e®ects setting in. As for ¯scal
policies, it is not required that the joining country originally fails the Maastricht Criteria.
Instead, the ¯ndings are more general: what are the e®ects of ¯scal policies turning more
contractionary?
Bearing this in mind, let us examine the relevance of this paper for prospective future
member countries of the EMU. Just before having received candidate status for EU mem-
bership the macroeconomic situation of most of them resembled the conditions in Italy
as of the 1980s. For instance, the Eastern Central European countries Poland, Hungary,
Slovenia and the Czech Republic had short term nominal interest rates between 15 % and
20 % and their currencies were grossly undervalued relative to purchasing power parity
(DIW, 1998). In 2002, nominal interest rates in these countries were still near or above
10 % (OEI, 2002). After that, anticipation e®ects based on the expectation of eventual
membership in the EMU may have set in, thereby reducing interest rate di®erentials even
further. Their ¯scal situation was/is generally not as bad as it was/is in Italy. Hungary
was the only one of these countries with debt and de¯cit ratios relative to GDP above those
prescribed by the Maastricht Criteria. Nonetheless, all prospective member countries are
asked to bring their ¯scal de¯cits down to levels prescribed by the Stability Pact.
27In summary, the case of Italy in the 1980s and the case of the current EMU candidates
is qualitatively similar and the qualitative ¯ndings of this paper may be applied. This
leads to the following policy recommendations: (i) it is highly recommendable to join
the European Monetary Union; (ii) if ¯scal consolidations are deemed necessary in a
situation without a monetary union, they may produce favourable results in the longer
term depending on the tightness of the ¯scal contractions and their supply side e®ects; (iii)
nonetheless, it may be advisable to combine a ¯scal retrenchment with the participation
in a monetary union (despite minor losses produced by ¯scal contractions under ¯scal-
CP conditions relative to EMU conditions without ¯scal adjustments), because e®ects
caused by the ¯scal retrenchment are clearly outweighed by overall gains from joining a
monetary union; (iv) there may be scope for adjusting the tightness of ¯scal contractions
(in terms of tax rate responses) { under the conditions of a monetary union { to political
circumstances, because the overall impact on the economy is hardly a®ected by the severity
of the ¯scal retrenchment; and (v) current member countries of a monetary union may
gain (rather than su®er) from ¯scal contractions conducted by newly joining members
(due to a depreciative e®ect on exchange rates, cf. observation 6).
Considering the unraveling of the Stability Pact, even more general conclusions could
be drawn on the basis of this study. In fact, I wonder if the EMU should reconsider
its policy towards prospective candidates. If the Stability Pact does not work fully, the
¯scal criteria of the Maastricht Treaty create unnecessary hardship with limited long term
bene¯ts. If the Stability Pact could be made to work, it would be better to pursue ¯scal
retrenchment policies in the ¯rst years of membership (or when there is a clear prospect of
membership, i.e. when interest rates start adjusting), but certainly not as a precondition
for membership . In other words, if the Stability Pact does not work, the ¯scal Maastricht
Criteria are damaging, and if the Pact does work, the ¯scal criteria are costly. In any case,
it seems unreasonable to delay the admission of candidate countries on the grounds of
incomplete ¯scal adjustments. The key issue is an e®ective Stability Pact, possibly based
on an independent commission rather than the European Council.
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